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Political Legitimacy between Democracy and Effectiveness:  
Trade-Offs, Interdependencies, and Discursive Constructions by the EU Institutions 
 
Abstract:  
This paper addresses the relationship between political legitimacy arising from a 
link with the ‘will of the people’, and political legitimacy arising from beneficial 
consequences for them. Questioning the common assumption of an inherent trade-
off between ‘input’ and ‘output legitimacy’, it suggests that the two necessarily go 
together, and that their relationship is continuously reconstructed through 
discursive contestation. These claims are first substantiated conceptually, in 
reference to the legitimacy literature in European Union (EU) Studies, which is 
situated in the broader fields of Political Theory and Comparative Politics. In a 
second step, the argument is developed on the grounds of empirical case material: 
an interpretive, non-quantitative reconstruction of the changing discourses on EU 
legitimacy by the European institutions from the 1950s to the early 2000s. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The understanding that political legitimacy can spring both or either from ‘democracy’—
including some form of consent, collective self-rule, or procedural criteria—and/or from 
‘effectiveness’—including beneficial consequences or utility gains—is as old as the study 
of political legitimacy. This dichotomy has been characterised as ‘input’ versus ‘output’ 
based legitimacy. Fritz Scharpf seminally distinguished between claims to legitimacy 
based (a) on ‘input authenticity’, that is, some link with the authentic preferences of the 
members of a community, and those resting (b) on ‘output efficiency’, or the effective 
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promotion of ‘the welfare of the constituency in question’ (Scharpf 1999:6-9). But long 
before and far beyond the domain of European integration for which Scharpf developed 
this classification, conceptions of democratic and procedural input and/or effective 
performance output as legitimacy sources have marked both normative and empirical 
accounts of political legitimacy.  
Normative political thought on political legitimacy comprises not only social 
contract and democratic theories, but also utilitarianism and consequentialism (see e.g. 
Rosanvallon 2011). Political theory deliberates whether the legitimacy of political 
institutions and the decisions made within them depends primarily on procedural 
features—including democracy- and rights-related ones—or whether this rather depends 
on the quality of the decisions made, and the ‘substantial values’ realised in them. A 
related point of discussion is whether or not legitimacy demands democracy (see Peter 
2010).  
On the other hand, empirical social science, and particularly research in the 
behaviouralist tradition, has also framed legitimacy in terms of the extent to which it is 
created, maintained, or lost, either on the side of democracy, procedural and rights-value, 
or identity-related considerations, or else on the side of regime or government 
performance. In contrast to normative theory, this type of work conceives of legitimacy, 
not as a virtue of political institutions or the decisions made within them, but rather as a 
belief or attitude on the part of their beholders, expressed in either public opinion or 
political behaviour, and measurable through large-n survey or panel data (see Levi est al. 
2009, Gilley 2006a:48). It mostly uses the term ‘legitimacy’, as in social legitimacy, 
synonymously with ‘regime support’. 
This paper explores the nexus between input- and output based legitimacy (see 
further Bellamy 2010; Heard-Lauréote 2010; Lindgren/Persson 2010; Skogstad 2003; 
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Torres 2006; Hobolt 2012). The precise research question posed here is that of what the 
nature of the relationship between the two types of legitimacy is. Are they mutually 
dependent, complementary, or do legitimacy gains on one side rather come at the price of 
losses on the other side of the dichotomy? Looking beyond the relative importance of the 
two types of legitimacy,1 this paper challenges the prevalent (and often wrongly cited) 
topos of a ‘democratic dilemma’ between ‘system effectiveness’ and democratic 
‘participation’ (Dahl 1994). Rather, it makes the case that input and output legitimacy 
necessarily go together.  
The paper is divided into three substantial sections and a conclusion. Section 1 
prepares the ground. It introduces the particular approach to political legitimacy 
advanced in this paper, and explains how this general approach contributes to the paper’s 
distinct take on the specific research question it addresses. Further, this section explains 
the methodological choices that flow from this approach. Section 2 develops the paper’s 
argument in engagement with the relevant EU Studies literature, situating it in the wider 
fields of Political Theory and Comparative Politics. It outlines a substantial gap in the 
literature, namely a certain blind spot regarding possible standards by which to assess 
                                                        
1 Behaviouralist research looking into the ‘universal’ determinants of legitimacy has found a 
strong correlation of regime support with ‘performance’ and especially ‘welfare gains’—that 
is, outputs—as well as with the input-related variables of ‘democratic rights’ and ‘good 
governance’ (Gilley 2006a:47-8, see 2009). Other studies attribute less importance to 
performance than to factors such as government trustworthiness and procedural justice, both 
of which can be associated with input-related democratic ideals (Booth/Seligson 2009; Levi et 
al. 2009). Yet others balance a ‘performance model’ of regime support with a ‘procedural 
model’, likewise suggesting that both performance and perceptions of democratic institutions 
and procedures contribute to popular support for a political order’s democracy (Hobolt 2012). 
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output performance as legitimacy enhancing. The section proposes that these measures 
or standards necessarily link output to input legitimacy. Section 3 moves on to 
substantiate the argument empirically. It presents the paper’s case material, a qualitative-
interpretive textual re-construction of how the input/output nexus played out in the 
discursive practices of the European institutions from the beginning of integration up to 
the early 2000s. The Conclusion, finally, brings Sections 2 and 3 together. It reflects on 
how the particular and context-dependent discursive history outlined may relate to the 
nature of the input/output legitimacy nexus more broadly.2 
1. THE UNDERLYING APPROACH TO LEGITIMACY AND THE RESULTING 
METHODOLOGICAL CHOICES 
The paper’s research question regarding the relationship between input and output 
legitimacy is tackled from a specific angle, which results from the distinctive way of 
approaching political legitimacy that it seeks to promote (see also Schrag Sternberg 
                                                        
2 Note that a third type of legitimacy, in between input and output legitimacy, is sometimes 
posited: ‘throughput’ legitimacy. This rests on the quality of decision-making processes judged 
in terms of accountability, transparency, efficacy, and openness to pluralist consultation 
(Schmidt 2012; Risse/Kleine 2007). The advantages of breaking open the systems-theoretical 
black box of what happens inside a political system when inputs are transformed into outputs 
(see Easton 1965) are of course considerable. However, throughput legitimacy can arguably be 
subsumed, as it is in this paper, under input-based legitimacy whenever procedural qualities 
of decision-making processes are framed with a view to how these processes would ensure a 
link with citizen preferences, and under output legitimacy whenever gains in ‘efficacy’ are 
appealed to. Moreover, as will be suggested below, mechanisms promoted under the banner of 
what would qualify as throughput legitimacy are often demanded on the grounds of projected 
gains in both output efficiency and input authenticity. 
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2013). This approach to legitimacy focusses on historically contingent understandings of 
what political legitimacy might mean, in a specific context, and as reflected in the 
discourses of specific, actual actors. It steers a course between two dominant and deeply 
divided camps in the scholarship: normative accounts debating the conditions under 
which people ought to accept something as legitimate, and empirical research into the 
extent and causes of them doing so. The conceptual starting point for this approach is the 
notion that something is legitimate not simply because people believe in its legitimacy, 
nor only because it meets certain abstract or ideal criteria. In addition to both of these, it 
is legitimate to the extent that it can be justified in terms of beliefs, narratives, and 
conceptual languages shared by and among dominants and subordinates (see Beetham 
2013:15-8; see further Habermas’s concept of ‘discursive justifiability’, 1973:139, 173). 
Such belief systems, and what it makes sense to say about an object’s legitimacy, 
are fundamentally pluralistic. Even the most minimal shared understandings (for 
instance, of what is relevant to an assessment of legitimacy to begin with) are essentially 
contested. They are subject to continual reconstruction. Deductive systematic arguments 
about what hypothetical rational or communicative actors would consider legitimate 
offer little help in exploring the involved processes of social contestation and 
construction. Quantitative empirical research, on the other hand, also sheds limited light 
on contests over what legitimacy means to people. This is because translating explicit and 
implicit argumentative-narrative logics, and the webs of meaning embedding them, into 
quantifiable codes, comes at the cost of a losing acuity regarding the very dynamics of 
meaning-making and contestation under scrutiny in this paper (see Yanow/Schwartz-
Shea 2006:xii). By contrast to both, this paper therefore investigates, inductively, the 
structures of arguments used by actual actors.  
The paper’s hermeneutic strategy thus emphasises the study of processes of 
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meaning-making and knowledge production. It focuses on such processes as expressed 
in, or as underlying, the discourses of key actors in key documents. In order to analyse 
the fine grain of discursive, narrative, and argumentative meaning-making in and across 
texts, the best method available is close reading, or non-quantitative interpretive textual 
analysis. Interpretation as a method is concerned, empirically, with how meaning is 
produced, contested, and reproduced (see Yanow/Schwartz-Shea 2006). Textual 
interpretation, particularly, concentrates on how this happens, both explicitly and 
implicitly, through language, narratives, imageries, concepts, or discursive logic.  
This paper’s approach is pragmatic in that it looks at contests over normative 
beliefs through the lens of the standards to which actors commit themselves, both in their 
political language and in their attempts to cope with practical problems. Understanding 
what they take for granted in what they say, and how the EU measures up to the reflected 
understandings of legitimacy, will ‘help identify [in this case, the EU’s] potential points of 
vulnerability, and explain any erosion of its ability to secure cooperation […] when under 
pressure’ (Beetham 2013:100). Approaching legitimacy in this way allows for an 
exploration, for a particular context (and a limited one, as explained shortly), of the 
discursive production of central justificatory principles and conventions about granting 
legitimacy, compliance, or consent that underpin the EU’s system of power. The narrow 
focus of this paper’s specific research question on the input/output nexus, in turn, 
permits zooming in on how input- and output-related arguments play out in these 
processes of knowledge production—and how this might reflect on potential general 
argumentative challenges innate to contests over political legitimacy at large. 
This study, then, is about arguments and claims regarding legitimacy, and their 
theoretical, cognitive, and associative underpinnings. It is not about regime support or 
the causal factors determining it. In other words, beliefs in legitimacy are not under 
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scrutiny, but rather specific discourses involved in producing meaning and knowledge 
about legitimacy. The aim here is not to offer a judgment about the degree of the EU’s 
legitimacy, neither in terms of measurable popular opinion nor in normative terms. 
Equally, it is not to propose an absolute definition of what legitimacy means in the 
particular case of the EU, based on some ‘representative sample’ of dominant ideas 
concerning this question. All of these research aims would impose stringent 
requirements concerning the avoidance of selection biases and the representativeness of 
the sources or passages cited in relation to the totality of discourses or beliefs about EU 
legitimacy.  
By comparison, this paper’s ambition is both more limited and more general. The 
value of its analyses lies in its scrutiny of how and on what grounds arguments are made 
in the particular subset of relevant discourses under study, and to what extent these 
argumentative structures might tell us something about the relationship between input 
and output legitimacy more generally. It is, of course, valid to ask whether or not other 
sets of discourses about EU or political legitimacy would display similar structures and 
run into similar argumentative challenges. This paper’s two-pronged approach, 
combining a general discussion of the academic literature (Section 2) with an analysis of 
a particular, limited set of EU-official discourses (Section 3), is an attempt to explore how 
legitimacy in this discursive context relates to the general nature of political legitimacy. 
The source material chosen for Section 3 includes public statements, declarations, 
treaty preambles, reports, and policy documents by the European institutions and 
political leaders. The time frame covered reaches from the 1950s to the early 2000s. On 
some level, even the academic literature discussed in Section 2 can be seen as another set 
of discourses, themselves projecting and reflecting specific lines of argument and 
assumptions. The analysis of these also throws light on the evolution and nature of what 
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could plausibly said about political legitimacy, and on how input- and output-related 
considerations come together in creating this plausibility. Excluded from the paper’s 
corpus are, importantly, other political, intellectual, media, or private discourses in the 
member-states’ public (and non-public private) spheres. Even so, the discourses 
discussed in Sections 2 and 3 arguably did represent important cognitive ‘maps’ available 
to people in finding their way through the ‘forest’ of the issue of EU legitimacy (see 
Gamson 1992:117). Moreover, they were in dialogue with wider public understandings 
and hence indirectly reflective of them, even if inversely, in their reaction to counter-
discourses.  
Drawn from research presented in a monograph offering a much broader 
discursive history of contests over EU legitimacy in EU-official as well as wider public 
discourses (Schrag Sternberg 2013), the sources cited in this paper are ‘representative 
rather than exhaustive’ (see Mottier 2005:258). That is to say, they were selected, in an 
iterative cycle, to illustrate key discursive positions and patterns, identified on the basis 
of the more comprehensive corpus used in the book. More particularly, with a view to 
this paper’s specific focus on the nexus between input- and output-related legitimacy 
arguments, the individual source references selected exemplify different types of 
argumentative patterns pertinent to this nexus, as well as particular argumentative 
challenges in regard to it. On this basis, key discourses discussed in Section 3 include 
those around integration furthering ‘peace and prosperity’ and a ‘common European 
good’, surrounding the advocacy of the 1960s and 1970s of a directly elected and strong 
European Parliament (EP), around the cross-institutional ‘People’s Europe’ campaign of 
the 1980s, and the ‘governance’ discourse of the early 2000s.  
Three further methodological criticisms might be anticipated as follows. First, the 
identification of relevant key discursive positions, patterns, and techniques constitutes 
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the very core of the interpretive process. It cannot therefore be frontloaded, and this is 
why no rigid scheme of analysis was used. Second, at the centre of this paper are the 
meanings of legitimacy projected and reflected in the discourses under study, that is, the 
content and internal logics of those discourses—not the actors advancing or 
instrumentalising them (who would be the focus in frame analyses in the 
Schattschneiderian tradition, see e.g. Daviter 2011, Fligstein 2001). For example, 
regardless of whether or not one expects the EP to favour input over output legitimacy, 
what is of interest in this particular paper are the grounds on which it makes whatever 
claims about EU legitimacy it makes. Finally, the paper does not seek to separate out 
input- and output-oriented claims about legitimacy from one another; most claims refer 
to both in some way, as will be argued. It does not measure the relative frequency or 
legitimacy-enhancing impact, nor possible correlations, of specific motifs, as quantitative 
discourse, frame, or content analyses endeavour to do (e.g. Bellamy 2010). This is 
because this study looks beyond correlations between (perceptions of) overall, input-, 
and output-based legitimacy (see Lindgren/Persson 2010 for a study of this).  Rather, it 
investigates ways of constructing their relationship, and the argumentative grounds on 
which they can be founded.  
If, say, positive perceptions of input legitimacy do go hand in hand with positive 
perceptions of output legitimacy, as Lindgren and Persson suggest, how can this link be 
constituted discursively? On what grounds does it make sense? How do constructions of 
the nexus change over time—and what might this tell us about the nature of input and 
output legitimacy, and how they relate to one another? Before turning to these questions 
in the context of the evolution of the European institutions’ discourses over time, let us 
first look at the relationship between input and output legitimacy in abstract terms, in 
reference to the relevant scholarly literature.  
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2. THE NEXUS AND THE LITERATURE: CAN ONE LEGITIMACY TYPE WORK 
WITHOUT THE OTHER? CAN IT WORK WITH THE OTHER? 
Scharpf’s basic normative claim was that the key foundation for the legitimacy of 
European integration and the EU lay not in their ‘input-authenticity’, but in the EU’s 
policy outputs (1999:6-9, 283; see also Majone 1996). This constituted a momentous 
change of perspective from existing accounts that had seen the EU’s legitimacy almost 
exclusively through the partial lens of its democratic legitimacy, or rather its ‘democratic 
deficit’. It ushered in a veritable output turn in the study of EU legitimacy (Bellamy 
2010:2-3). This turn affected both normative accounts engaged in de- and re-constructing 
standards of legitimate political order in the EU context, and empirical accounts assessing 
this polity against such standards. In the study of public support for integration, 
‘utilitarian’ cost-benefit consideration came to function as a key explanatory factor (e.g. 
Gabel 1998). Beyond the EU case, empirical research into the ‘universal sources’ of 
legitimacy has also challenged political theory’s common focus on democratic 
procedures, rights, or moral obligations as foundations of political legitimacy, finding 
positive correlations between perceptions of performance and of legitimacy (Gilley 2006; 
see also Hechter 2009). 
The lacuna of a measure of output legitimacy, and its necessary link to input 
legitimacy 
What precisely counts as legitimacy-enhancing output in accounts emphasising 
output legitimacy varies considerably. Definitions range from general problem-solving 
effectiveness in tackling the complex problems of an internationalising world (Risse 
2006:191), and effectiveness in fulfilling specific tasks delegated by public actors (Majone 
1998), to efficient ‘performance in meeting the needs and values of citizens’ 
(Lord/Beetham 2001:444). These definitions have in common that they describe abstract 
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categories that need to be filled with substance. Which problems are to be solved, how 
are tasks to be chosen and prioritised, how are the burdens and benefits of tackling them 
divided? Who can legitimately delegate which tasks, according to which procedures, and 
on what grounds—and how can the accountability of agents be ensured? Finally, how are 
the relevant citizen needs and values to be determined, prioritised, and weighted against 
one another? All of these questions effectively raise issues of input-authenticity.  
In particular, identifying legitimacy-relevant outputs requires some way of linking 
outputs to citizen preferences. Not just any output will do. It needs some claim to input 
authenticity, whether through effective responsiveness or substantive representation, 
formal representation, authorisation, electoral accountability, or other forms of 
participation. The keystone of all arguments about output legitimacy is some measure of 
what constitutes legitimacy-enhancing outputs. Most output-focused accounts of 
legitimacy tend to hinge on an ‘implicit conception’ of the public interest or common 
welfare, the promotion of which establishes output legitimacy (Moravcsik/Sangiovanni 
2002:125-6), in Scharpf’s case, this consists in an effective balance between EU-level 
market liberalisation and national social protection (1999:43-83, 199), in Majone’s, the 
presumed citizen wish to ‘preserve national sovereignty largely intact’ (1998:5, 7, 14). 
Both thus link their measure of legitimacy-enhancing output to substantive claims about 
this being ‘what the citizens want’, and about how effectively EU action responds to it. In 
Hanna Pitkin’s categorisation, they project ‘substantive representation’ (Pitkin 1967).  
To be sure, the difficulties in determining what the people really want, and hence 
what kinds of outputs would enhance legitimacy, are considerable. Public opinion 
research provides useful indications, but reaches its limits when it comes to aggregating 
preferences between more than two options, or dealing with trade-offs between 
competing goals, or goals that cannot be ordered on a single (e.g. left-right) dimension 
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(see Moravcsik/Sangiovanni 2002:140-3). In any case, claims to a link between 
government action and the will of citizens often rely on arguments about the procedural 
qualities of the processes by which its ends and goals were defined (see above footnote 
2). Typically, these take the form, at least partly, of arguments about formal 
representation through the institutions of majoritarian, competitive party democracy 
(see Bellamy 2010; Kraus 2004:562). Or they may draw on arguments about 
representation through non-majoritarian practices of participatory democracy, or 
through ‘communicatively generated power’ produced through deliberation in 
independent public spheres (Habermas 1996:301-2). All of these arguments are 
effectively arguments about input legitimacy, in the sense of supporting a claim to a 
connection between outputs and citizen preferences. 
Some scholars further argue that output legitimacy presupposes yet another type 
of input authenticity, namely a certain shared belief in a collective identity, or a certain 
‘consensus’ over values and principles. Both of these supposedly promote output 
efficiency by favouring choices in line with a general orientation towards the common 
good of the political body as a whole (e.g. Scharpf 1999:7-9, 13; Kraus 2004:562; but see 
White 2010a). Note that Scharpf also posits collective identity to be a necessary condition 
for input (in addition to output) legitimacy; for majority rule to lose its ‘threatening 
character’, and for engendering ‘trust in the benevolence’ of one’s fellow citizens (1999:7-
9, 13). This consensus or collective identity requirement, of course, ‘misrepresents much 
mainstream work in democratic theory’ that starts from the premises of pluralistic 
interests or principled disagreement (Bellamy 2010:3). With a view to the relationship 
between input and output legitimacy, identity and consensus are examples of something 
held necessary for both, input and output legitimacy thus seem at times to be favoured by 
the same factors or measures. 
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To summarise, output-oriented accounts of legitimacy depend on some notion of, 
or process of defining, the ends and goals of the political order and its actions. These 
somehow acceptable ends and goals provide the measure of legitimacy-enhancing 
performance, and necessarily link effective output to some level of input legitimacy. If 
output legitimacy arguments thus depend, by their own logic, on some claim to input 
legitimacy, conversely, can input legitimacy work without output legitimacy? Does this 
dependence run both ways? 
Complementarity 
There are a number of ways in which input and output legitimacy-related 
arguments are complementary to one another in building overall legitimacy. This external 
complementarity is qualitatively different from the internal dependence (by virtue of their 
own argumentative logic) of output legitimacy arguments on input-related arguments 
proposed in the previous section. The complementary relationship does seem to work in 
both directions.  
On one hand, input-oriented arguments ‘never carry the full burden of legitimizing 
the exercise of governing power’, but tend to be supplemented by output-oriented 
arguments about positive outcomes for the public interest (Scharpf 1999:188, 43-83). 
Arguments about the legitimacy of democratic systems, for example, involve not only 
input-related claims about democratic credentials, but often also output-focused 
democratic growth or democratic peace theses (e.g. Dahl 1998:57-9). Even a political 
system with reasonable claims to input legitimacy (on grounds of electoral accountability, 
representation, etc.) might be seen as illegitimate if it fails to provide certain outputs, 
such as securing its citizens’ safety, protecting their property, or providing an 
environment in which they can secure a livelihood.  
On the other hand, output legitimacy is only ever as stable as performance outputs 
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are. It may depend on input legitimacy to help to ride out periods of performance 
difficulties (see Zhao 2009; Easton 1965:273). This is true especially if the performance 
of outputs depends on factors beyond the control of the regime in question (Habermas 
1973). The current Eurozone crisis once again underlines the danger of resting the 
legitimacy of a political order too exclusively on performance outputs, especially under 
such circumstances. 
In sum, neither input authenticity nor output efficiency can durably do the job of 
building overall legitimacy on their own. Yet one type can complement and partly, or 
temporarily, make up for deficiencies of the other. The very backdrop to the output turn 
in the study of EU legitimacy illustrates this. Generally, legitimacy accounts that put the 
emphasis on either one type of legitimacy source are often grounded in a critique of the 
state of affairs regarding the other type. The academic interest in output-based legitimacy 
was in tune with a growing disillusionment across liberal democracies with the prospects 
for input-based legitimacy, and with the traditional institutions of representative 
democracy (see Norris 1999). In the EU case, these prospects were further constricted by 
the structural limitations particular to its unique political order. Paradoxically, even a 
dramatic increase in EP powers had not changed public opinion from seeing the 
Community as a ‘non-democratic set of institutions’ and the EP as ‘distant, powerless, and 
poorly representative’. By the mid-1990s, the previously dominant analysis, whereby the 
‘obvious’ solution to the EU’s legitimacy deficit was to strengthen the EP, lost its 
hegemony (Magnette 2001:292-3).  
The academic ‘output’, ‘participatory’, and ‘governance turns’ 
One common response was to focus arguments about EU legitimacy on its output-
related problem-solving performance rather than on unwinnable claims to its input 
legitimacy (see Bellamy 2010:3; Scharpf 1999:187-9, 7-9, 21). Other parts of the debate, 
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by contrast, took the difficulties of electoral democracy as a starting point for exploring 
alternative ‘non-majoritarian’ or ‘postparliamentary’ modes of legitimation and 
governance (Dehousse 1995; Lord/Beetham 2001; Majone 1996; see Kohler-
Koch/Rittberger 2007:27). These modes had a hybrid status uniting output- and input-
oriented arguments. They clustered around the ideas of ‘participatory democracy’ and of 
the EU as a ‘regulatory state’. These will be discussed, in turn, in what follows. 
The central idea behind the academic debate’s ‘participatory turn’ was to involve 
interest groups and civil society organisations (rather than bureaucrats, representatives 
of individual citizens, or political parties) in policy-making, relying only marginally on 
legislation (Saurugger 2008:1275; Greenwood 2007:333; Finke 2007). This took 
inspiration from the models of interest-group pluralism and deliberative democracy. 
‘Participatory democracy’ in the EU was advocated partly in appeal to related gains in 
input legitimacy. More particularly, these appeals concerned equal representation 
(Saurugger 2008:1276; see Skogstad 2003:322) or equal and fair public deliberation by 
those concerned by the policy in question. Gains in accountability were also appealed to, 
if only in the somewhat figurative sense that policy makers could expect to have to justify 
their decisions to those affected, and would therefore feel responsible to them (Risse 
2006:192-3, 186). To be sure, the input legitimacy-related democratic credentials of civil 
society consultations were controversial. They were especially so on grounds of their 
elitist and top-down nature, citizens’ uneven access to them, and the insufficiently 
democratic internal structures of civil society organisations themselves (e.g. Magnette 
2003; Neyer 2003:687; Grande 2000:29-30, 129). Perhaps this is why ‘functional’ or 
instrumental arguments about increased output effectiveness were also crucial in the 
advocacy and justification of associative or participatory democracy. Accordingly, 
involving concerned actors helped overcome implementation problems by mobilising 
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their willingness, compliance, and expert resources; even purely subjective, informal 
accountability to stakeholders enhanced the effectiveness of governance arrangements 
(Saurugger 2008:1276; Finke 2007:6-10; Greenwood 2007:340; Hurd 1999:387; Neyer 
2003; Risse 2006:186, 193).  
Justifications of the EU as a ‘regulatory state’ likewise included appeals to both 
input and output legitimacy. At their heart was the delegation of specific tasks to semi-
autonomous authorities such as constitutional courts, central banks, or other regulatory 
and administrative agencies. This was justified as common practice in advanced 
industrial democracies, and as well suited for the specific policy fields in which the EU 
was active (Majone 1996, Lindseth 2010:104; Moravcsik 2002). The recipients of 
delegated regulatory power worked in essentially output-driven, depoliticised and 
expertise-based modes of ‘administrative governance’. Still, delegation was also an input-
driven ‘normative-legal’ principle. It required a ‘lawful legislative enactment’ or ‘loi 
cadre’, which effectively depended on some input-based claim to majoritarian-democratic 
legitimacy (Lindseth 2010:2, 104; see Majone 2005:7). Mostly, however, input-related 
justifications of delegation were overpowered by output-oriented ones. The ‘loss of 
democratic control’ following delegation was centrally justified by its consequences; it 
enhanced ‘the ability of political systems to produce outcomes in the public interest’ 
(Moravcsik/Sangiovanni 2002:129, see Majone 1998). Is the zero-sum relationship 
between input and output legitimacy assumed in this example to be taken for granted? 
Is there an inescapable trade-off? 
Many EU scholars imply, and some directly assert, ‘an inevitable trade-off’ 
between ‘an emphasis on government for the people and an emphasis on government by 
the people’ (Katz/Wessels 1999:5; see Torres 2006; Lindgren/Persson 2010:452-3). The 
common assumption is that ‘the “effectiveness” of outcomes would be unacceptably 
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harmed if dissenting views were acknowledged and engaged at each stage’ (White 
2010b:56).  
Yet even if input and output legitimacy are indeed antithetical in some of their 
many respective shapes, or in some contexts, they might not be in others. This has in fact 
been a central argument in favour of participatory or deliberative (non-majoritarian) 
democracy. Both are partly advocated as a way of overcoming a supposed input/output 
trade-off existing for traditional models of representative democracy (see e.g. Skogstad 
2003:222-5; see White 2010b:59; but Bellamy 2010:3). However, non-majoritarian 
mechanisms of input legitimacy have also been argued to have ‘perverse rather than 
beneficial effects’ on output efficiency (Bellamy 2010:2). One of the challenges of creating 
and maintaining political legitimacy, then, might be that even if input and output 
legitimacy do depend on each other in some ways, they might still conflict in others. In 
other words, they might be both mutually reinforcing and antithetical, either at the same 
time, or at different points in time.  
Winston Churchill, for example, made such a temporal distinction in an interview 
of January 1939. Asked whether it was ‘possible to combine the reality of democratic 
freedom with efficient military organisation’, he conceded that it ‘may be that greater 
efficiency in secret military preparations can be achieved in a country with autocratic 
institutions than by the democratic system. But,’ he went on, ‘this advantage is not 
necessarily great, and it is far outweighed by the strength of a democratic country in a 
long war [in that] the people feel that they are responsible, and […] will hold out much 
longer than the population of Dictator States.’3 In the medium term, Churchill argued, an 
initially less efficient input-legitimate democratic system would win out in terms of 
                                                        
3 New Statesman 07/01/1939, reprinted in the 20/12/2013-09/01/2014 issue. 
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output effectiveness as well.  
If, however, input and output legitimacy can indeed be both interdependent or 
mutually reinforcing and in a trade-off relationship, depending on time and context, then 
the durable solution cannot be to sacrifice one for the other. Rather, legitimacy claims will 
have to carefully negotiate their balance, and consider how input and output legitimacy 
relate to each other, lest overall legitimacy be undermined. Britain’s situation on the eve 
of World War II powerfully illustrates the urgency of safeguarding democracy as well as 
efficiency. The next section of this paper explores how the balancing act between input 
and output legitimacy has played out in another specific context of practical (non-
academic) discursive practice. 
3. THE NEXUS IN DISCURSIVE HISTORY 
This section reconstructs how legitimacy discourses in the environment of the European 
institutions have negotiated the relationship between input- and output-based legitimacy 
claims. What references did they make to the respective types of arguments, and to what 
extent did references to one necessitate an explicit or implicit reference to the other? In 
other words, to what extent did input and output legitimacy belong together in the logic 
of these discourses? Does the long-term history of EU legitimacy discourses, too, suggest 
that the two complemented each other over time? How, in particular, were the 
legitimacy-enhancing ends and goals of the emerging European polity forged and 
defined? The underlying aim of this exercise is to investigate what insights such an 
analysis can offer for the conceptual debate on EU legitimacy. 
Forging and Furthering a European ‘Common Good’: Pure Output Legitimacy?  
For the early years of integration, claims to legitimacy were to an important degree 
output-oriented—even if never quite exclusively, as will be argued in the subsequent 
subsections. Virtually all sources framed the legitimacy of integration at least partly in 
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reference to a promise of making peace and prosperity possible in Europe. On one hand, 
integration was almost ritually cast against Europe’s long and still fresh history of 
bloodshed and war—and the continued threat of war ‘if we did nothing’ (Monnet 
1978:289; see e.g. Preamble ECSC Treaty). More particularly, integration featured as a 
way to contain Germany (e.g. Schuman Declaration 1950), to discourage the ‘Eastern 
powers’ from striving for ‘the control of Europe and the continuation of the world 
revolution’ (Hallstein 1955), and to keep totalitarianism at bay at home and abroad (e.g. 
Preamble EEC Treaty). On the other hand, early discourses legitimating the European 
Communities routinely highlighted the ‘new prospects of progress and prosperity’ 
opened up by European integration (CEC 1958:9). The promise of a ‘higher standard of 
living’ or ‘improved living conditions’ (to be achieved through the growth, productivity 
increases, modernisation effects, and economies of scale associated with Europe-wide 
markets) pervaded pro-Communities discourses throughout the 1950s and 1960s. A 
common label for this was the emblem of ‘economic and social progress’ (see e.g. Messina 
Declaration 1955; Preamble ECSC Treaty; Spaak 1957; Hallstein 1951:3).  
These ‘peace’ and ‘prosperity’ storylines were essentially means of establishing 
that there was such a thing as a ‘European common good’. The furtherance of this 
common good formed the basis, and measure, of integration, and of the Communities’ 
output legitimacy. This storyline was grounded on a related one; that integration was 
‘indispensable’, a matter of no alternative, and even of survival (e.g. Monnet 1962, 
Marjolin 1958:5). Integration widely featured as indispensable to safeguarding peace in 
Europe and hence, given the horrors of the alternative, as simply indispensable. 
Economic reconstruction and better living conditions were a universal, uncontroversial 
aspiration in war-torn and post-war Europe, and early legitimating discourses framed 
integration as indispensable to achieving the necessary growth. Moreover, ‘economic and 
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social progress’ was indispensable for making integration sustainable, and thereby peace 
possible (CEC 1960:20). This line of argument transferred the existential indispensability 
of creating a working peace system to the (far from obvious) choice of economic 
integration as the way to do it. In the ‘indispensability’ discourse, potentially clashing 
national, partisan, and individual interests converged in one shared interest, which rested 
on the existential necessity of peace, economic growth, and hence the European 
Communities.  
The discourse of the ‘common European interest’ was further associated with a 
discourse about the growing ‘interdependence’ of the West European nation-states. This 
discourse had the latter as a ‘community of fate’ with a ‘common destiny’, existentially 
dependent on unity (Monnet 1962; Preamble ECSC Treaty). The reasons given for this 
included external factors such as Cold-War international relations  (Hallstein 1959:2; 
Monnet 1962) and the progress of modern technology and mass production, which had 
turned national markets into an ‘anachronistic form of economic organization’ (Marjolin 
1958:4). In addition, the member-states were deliberately manipulating their 
opportunity structures in founding the European Communities, indissolubly entangling 
national interests in a shared European interest in a functionalist fashion (e.g. Schuman 
Declaration 1950). The Preamble to the ECSC Treaty referred to this as the attempt ‘to 
substitute for historic rivalries a fusion of their essential interests’.    
Many early legitimating discourses, furthermore, placed great emphasis on hope, 
agency, and the determination to bring about a better future through political action (e.g. 
Hallstein 1951:14; Mansholt 1958; Martino 1957). European integration was commonly 
celebrated as the ‘greatest voluntary and purposeful transformation in the history of 
Europe’ (Spaak 1957, see Marjolin 1958:1). It embodied a new type of politics: no longer 
‘the art of the possible’, but ‘the art of the maximum possible’ (Hallstein 1959:1). This 
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way of seeing integration was embedded in a general confidence, in post-war Europe, in 
social engineering and progress on the basis of expert rationalities, planning, and 
impartial technocracy (see Walters/Haahr 2005:21-41). According to this mindset, good 
and legitimate government was government that was efficient, impartial, predictable, and 
helpful in solving concrete problems. This was often opposed to the ‘excited demands’, 
passions, and nationalist impulses associated with ‘politics’ (e.g. Haas 1963:159).  
In light of the period’s recent history, moreover, unobstructed mass politics and 
majoritarian democracy were potentially suspicious, as well as possibly harmful to 
performance efficiency. Democratic inputs, on this understanding, could be antithetical to 
output efficiency, which was the overpowering aspiration. Arguably ‘democracy’ emerged 
only gradually, over the course of the fifteen years following the Second World War, as 
the key element of political legitimacy in the member-states (Conway/Depkat 2010). Of 
course, a contemporaneous counter-discourse did insist on democracy, including on 
supranational elements of it, as a condition for the emerging Communities’ legitimacy 
(see e.g. Schrag Sternberg 2013:46-61). In addition, even output-biased claims to their 
legitimacy never really left questions of democratic input legitimacy out of the equation. 
The Need for Input Legitimacy, and the ‘Eminently Political’ Nature of Integration 
Even where early legitimation discourses gave a central place to the delivery of 
efficient problem solving, they nevertheless often combined their claims to output 
legitimacy with some—possibly implicit—reference to input legitimacy as well. Efficient 
outputs such as ‘economic and social progress’ featured not least as means of ‘prov[ing] 
to its constituent peoples the advantages of integration’ (CEC 1960:20). This framed 
citizen approval and some level of input authenticity as necessary, if only for making 
integration sustainable, and the efficient delivery of other outputs, specifically durable 
peace, possible.  
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What is more, even the most heavily output-biased legitimation discourses 
depended on some claim to input legitimacy. The voluntary-transformation discourse, for 
one, implicitly depended on input legitimacy by way of the normative-legal principle of 
delegation discussed in Section 2. Even if eventually, once the new institutions were in 
place, ‘the moment of the technicians arrive[d]’ (Monnet 1978:321), the legitimacy of the 
institutions and their subsequent actions did rely on an input-legitimate initial act of 
authorisation. By signing and ratifying the ‘outline’ treaties (Hallstein 1965), legitimate 
national democratic representatives had fixed the ‘general objectives’ for Community 
action (CEC 1960:19), and the ‘normative frameworks’ and ‘standards […] within which 
the Community [could] act’ (CEC 1972:17, see also 1958:15).  
More fundamentally, the very aim of the ‘common European good’ discourse was 
to make plausible that European integration delivered essentially what the European 
citizens wanted. Much like Scharpf and Majone’s accounts, discussed above, it linked up 
with a particular conception of what the Europeans wanted, or should want; namely, 
peace and prosperity. Seemingly purely output-focused, the discourses establishing the 
European Communities as the best available way to achieving peace, prosperity, and 
generally efficient problem-solving, also laid claim to the input-authenticity or 
substantive representativeness of these outputs, that is, to their accordance with citizen 
preferences.  
Indeed, early legitimation discourses tended to project integration as responding 
to a public consensus about its purpose, ends, and goals. This consensus supposedly arose 
from an insight into integration’s existential indispensability (e.g. Haas 1968a:456; CEC 
1976:11). The dependency of output legitimacy on some claim to the input authenticity of 
the outputs at hand came to light particularly compellingly wherever such a consensus 
could not be taken for granted. Early integration history was full of illustrations that not 
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everyone agreed about what the Communities should be doing and how (for example, the 
failure of the European Defence Community, or the struggles of the 1960s over how 
supranational the Communities should be). Discursive projections of consensus were up 
against powerful counter-discourses that emphasised, instead, disagreement, pluralism 
of preferences, and clashing interests. These counter-discourses attacked representations 
of integration as a non-contentious win-win enterprise in everyone’s interest, where 
short-term ‘sacrifices’ would be ‘compensated’ by the commonly enjoyed peace and ‘the 
shared prosperity of tomorrow’ (Martino 1957; see CEC 1972:34).4  
Even if it could be claimed there had at one time been a consensus about the 
overarching objectives of integration, or if the treaties had somehow legitimately fixed 
them beyond the realm of contestation—there still remained ‘fundamental choices’ to be 
made about the ‘ways and means’ of pursuing them (EPA 1960b:17; CEC 1960:19). These 
choices were ‘eminently political act[s]’. Not only did their consequences benefit and tax 
some more than others (Hallstein 1965), they were also simply too important and ‘far-
reaching’, and comprised too existential a ‘gamble on the future’ embracing ‘the whole 
economic life of our six countries’, to be left to ‘a handful of good experts’ who would 
‘settle all problems to general satisfaction’ (EPA 1960b:17). Whereas technocratic 
discourses portrayed the nature and goals of the integration project as too important to 
allow the people to interfere with and possibly obstruct them, this counter-discourse held 
them as too important not to involve the people in their pursuit (EP 1963b:2). In brief, 
                                                        
4 After all, peace may perhaps have been a paradigmatic ‘pure public good’ in that no one could be 
excluded from enjoying it, and its enjoyment by some did not distract from its enjoyment by 
others. Prosperity, by contrast, was highly ‘excludable’ and ‘rivalrous in consumption’ (Kaul et 
al. 2001:4), and therefore contentious. So was the distribution of the provisional sacrifices 
incurred for the sake both of peace and prosperity, as well as of the preliminary gains. 
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the Communities’ legitimacy could not rest on outputs alone.  
Supranational Parliamentary Democracy: the Solution to Input-Legitimacy Deficits 
Only? 
The discourse of the ‘eminently political’ nature of Community politics marked 
much of the advocacy for European elections and EP powers of the 1960s and 70s (as 
well as earlier). Often articulated with a critique of the technocratic approach, this 
advocacy linked up with the argument that legitimately taking the essentially political 
choices involved required some element of democratic input, and more specifically, an 
element of supranational parliamentary democracy. Versions of this argument sometimes 
appealed to entrenched beliefs in the legitimating power of representative democracy in 
the national context, but added that ‘the Community need[ed] to find its own democratic 
legitimation beyond that which can be transmitted to it by the governments responsible’ 
or the national parliaments (CEC 1972:12, 32; see e.g. EPA 1960b; EP 1963a, 1969). 
These discourses formed a prototype (Schrag Sternberg 2013:57-8) of the later academic 
‘classic democratic deficit theory’ (Dehousse 1995:125). They constituted counter-
discourses to the above output-focused legitimacy narratives from the very beginning of 
integration.  
Interestingly, advocates of a strong and directly elected EP often demanded these 
supranational electoral-representative elements of input-legitimation at least partly on 
output-oriented grounds. To be sure, one role of the EP was to make executive policy 
making responsive to citizen needs and expectations. It was to keep the Communities ‘in 
close and permanent touch with political and human realities’ (CEC 1961:19). In this 
discourse, the EP featured as the ‘sounding board’ as well as the ‘stimulator of this public 
opinion’ (CEC 1972:34). European elections were attributed an almost magic power to 
mobilise popular support for integration and ‘directly to associate the peoples to the 
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building of Europe’ (EPA 1960a:834, see 1960b:16-7, 1963b:25; CEC 1961:19). These 
discourses partly equated the Communities’ democratic legitimacy and input authenticity 
with popular support. Yet they represented popular support, in turn, as necessary not 
least for output-oriented reasons: the ‘active support of public opinion’ and the pressure 
of public opinion on political leaders and policy makers were needed for ‘sustaining’ or 
‘advancing Europe’, and specifically for overcoming collective action problems and the 
‘divergences and particularisms of the moment’ (CEC 1958:13-4, see 1958:13; EPA 
1960b:16-7). On this understanding, input legitimacy was required for making efficient 
outputs possible, by giving room to the ‘political will’ that provided ‘the only way out of 
dead ends’ once ‘the experts’ resources’ were ‘exhausted’ (EPA 1960b:16-7). 
Finally, an elected EP would improve the Communities’ output efficiency by 
allowing it to capitalise on its ‘new political authority’, flowing from its democratic input 
legitimacy (CEC 1976:29). The EP was celebrated as a ‘motor’ of European integration 
(EP 1963b:2-4), or a counterweight to the ‘centrifugal tendencies’ plaguing the 
Community construction (EPA 1960b:16, see van der Stoel 1976). A strong and elected 
EP could help to generate a ‘supranational will’ (EP 1963b:1). ‘Supranational’ was used 
here in the sense not only of standing above ‘national thinking’ (e.g. Hallstein 1955; 
1959:2; Mansholt 1958), but also in that of wanting more supranationalism—which, in 
these discourses, would make the Communities more output efficient. Both discourses, of 
the EP as a stimulator of public support and a motor of integration, framed input 
authenticity as necessary for optimising the Communities’ problem-solving and policy 
output, making them sustainable, and helping them to ‘do their job well’.  
In sum, input authenticity and output legitimacy were intertwined in discourses 
advocating a strong supranational parliamentary element for the Communities’ emerging 
political order. These discourses counter-balanced the output-focused ‘peace and 
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prosperity’ and ‘European common good’ narratives from the very outset of integration.  
The People’s Europe and Governance Discourses: Overcoming the Trade-off? 
As with the more recent Eurozone crisis, the financial and economic crises of the 
1970s dealt a blow to legitimacy claims founded on the provision of prosperity and peace 
in Europe. In the face of recession, many questioned whether economic integration 
actually was effective, and the only available choice, in seeking to safeguard peace. A 
concurrent debate on the ‘legitimation crisis’ of the capitalist welfare state underlined the 
danger of resting legitimacy exclusively on performance outputs (e.g. Habermas 1973). 
The star of social engineering was fading, which further rendered the foundation of the 
Communities’ legitimacy on efficient, technocratic output performance a liability. In fact, 
claims to integration’s legitimacy were now increasingly threatened by the association of 
the Communities, and especially of its supranational elements, with ‘technocracy’ and 
legitimacy only through output performance. This was true especially when ‘politics’ and 
input legitimacy through representative democracy were associated with the nation-state 
(e.g. de Gaulle 1965).  
As a result of all this, the storyline of integration as furthering an uncontroversial 
European common good was crumbling. Integration had lost its ‘guiding light, namely the 
political consensus […] on our reasons for undertaking this joint task’ (CEC 1976:11). The 
Communities’ output legitimacy increasingly seemed to depend on input legitimacy as 
well, both as a way of riding out these times of performance difficulties and for endowing 
its outputs with some claim to input authenticity. Otherwise these outputs’ legitimating 
power would be lost, and the de-legitimating power of performance difficulties 
heightened. What the Communities did, and how they evolved, needed to rest on a 
plausible claim to be reflecting the needs, desires, and interests of the European citizens, 
if it were to pass as legitimate itself and to convey overall legitimacy on the Communities. 
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The ‘need to redefine the objectives of European integration’ in line with what 
would make its subjects endorse the process became a frequent motif in discourses on 
the Community’s legitimacy in the late 1970s and the 1980s (here EP 1984; see similarly 
CEC 1988a:4, 1985; Council 1984). This motif formed part of a radical change of 
perspective in official legitimation rhetoric, which increasingly centred on the point of 
view of the European citizens: ‘We must listen to our people. What do the Europeans 
want? What do they expect from a united Europe?’ (CEC 1976:11). In the 1980s, this 
understanding found an emblem in the discourse and policies around the ‘People’s 
Europe’ campaign. The latter’s defining target stated that ‘the Community should respond 
to the expectations of the people of Europe’ (Council 1984; see CEC 1976:13; 1985:5).  
On the face of it, this change of perspective constituted a turn towards input-based 
foundations of legitimacy, towards concern for input authenticity and substantive 
representation. Yet the ‘citizen expectations’ at the heart of this discourse played an 
ambiguous role. They featured as an independent source of legitimacy, but at the same 
time also as an object of top-down manipulation. Citizen expectations were to be 
moulded, for instance, through intensified, carefully tailored communication and 
information policies, the quantification of the ‘costs of non-Europe’, or cultural and 
identity-building policies (e.g. CEC 1985:10-11, 20; CEC 1988b). On balance, legitimacy in 
the People’s Europe discourse still very much flowed from this Europe’s performing 
specific outputs. But the objectives of these outputs were now increasingly framed in 
terms of what the citizens wanted, of their ‘most immediate concerns’ or ‘deepest 
aspirations’ (Santer 1985; CEC 1973:I; see Council 1984:11; 1983:24). A certain misgiving 
about giving citizens too much agency—which they may well put to the use of 
obstruction—betrayed a persisting understanding that input authenticity and 
unmediated participation or even representation could be antithetical to output 
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efficiency.   
The discourse of  ‘governance’, in turn, was championed by the Commission’s 2001 
White Paper, in close dialogue with the academic paradigm of participatory democracy 
discussed above. It was one of the responses by the European institutions to the EU’s 
ongoing and much-deplored ‘legitimacy crisis’, ushered in not least by the difficult 
ratification of Maastricht.5 The governance discourse had strong input legitimacy-related 
elements: ‘When we speak of “governance” we are, in fact, discussing democracy’ (Prodi 
2001; see similarly CEC 2001:32). Yet it aspired to a new type of democracy, superior to 
the classic majoritarian, electoral, and particularly, the parliamentary model of 
democracy, all of which suffered from a ‘growing crisis of faith’ and ‘disenchantment’ 
(Prodi 2001; see Vignon 2000:4), and had led to the citizens’ ‘alienation from politics’ 
(CEC 2001:32). Governance by contrast embodied the ‘kind of democracy our fellow-
citizens want’ (Prodi 2001): a more “genuine” type of democracy that was ‘much more 
participatory, “hands-on”’ (Prodi 2000). Like the academic ‘participatory turn’ discussed 
above, the governance paradigm rested centrally on the involvement and consultation of 
civil society organisations (CEC 2001:11-8). While the motivation for this consisted partly 
in ‘giving voice to the concerns of citizens’ and hence in increasing input authenticity, it 
also lay in more successfully ‘delivering services that meet people’s needs’. Explicitly:  
                                                        
5 Earlier techniques of discursive crisis management by the EU institutions included focusing 
attention on the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’. This diverted attention from very considerable 
popular concerns with Economic and Monetary Union, as well as with whether democracy was 
conceivable at all beyond the confines of the nation-state. In addition, Council and Commission 
especially stretched the meaning of ‘democracy’ to re-define it in terms of openness, 
transparency, and subsidiarity rather than its electoral or majoritarian senses (Schrag 
Sternberg 2013:103-52). 
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‘Participation is not about institutionalising protest. It is about more effective policy 
shaping’ (CEC 2001:14-5).  
In sum, both the People’s Europe and the governance discourses were in part 
attempts to explore and institutionalise new kinds of input legitimation; ones that would 
not endanger policy outputs and the progress of integration as a whole. Yet both 
discourses continued to subscribe to the output-oriented principle that ‘Effective action 
by European institutions [was] the greatest source of their legitimacy’ (Prodi 2000; see 
e.g. CEC 1995:2, 5). The novelty was that they made more of a discursive effort to 
represent this action in reference to what the citizens wanted and needed. 
OUTLOOK AND CONCLUSION 
The recent Eurozone crisis has once again placed output-based claims to the EU’s 
legitimacy under fire. In addition, fundamental disagreements and conflicts about how to 
address the crisis have raised questions regarding the input-legitimacy of any course of 
action, including its authorisation, its accountability, or link to the will of European 
citizens. Eurosceptic parties are on the rise in many member-states. Even before the 
current crisis, gaining support for the draft constitutional and Lisbon treaties had proved 
extremely difficult. Debates in (and possibly among) member-state publics about these 
reform attempts, as well as about the current crisis, have turned on conflicting visions for 
their countries’ and Europe’s political, economic, and social futures. In short, during the 
past decade or so, EU politics and European integration have been subject to intense 
public and political politicisation.  
This suggests that interlocking input and output legitimacy might not so much 
require a simple match between outputs and citizen preferences, to which the People’s 
Europe discourse aspired—and which has shown itself downright impossible given the 
heterogeneity and fundamental clash of citizen preferences and interests. Rather, such an 
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interlocking seems to require opportunities and structures appraising and channelling 
this contestation. The absence of a consensus on what kinds of policies the EU should 
deliver has become impossible to deny. The politicisation of EU politics of the past few 
years can be read, moreover, as a forceful expression of people’s will to influence 
decisions about their countries’ and Europe’s future, and not only through the 
Habermasian ‘communicatively generated power’ of public deliberation, but also directly 
through the classic mechanisms of electoral party democracy (see Bellamy 2010). 
Ironically, the polarisation of public debate and popular opinion makes majoritarian 
democracy, which concentrates democratic input on elections, actually seem to imply less 
of a trade-off between input and output legitimacy than post-majoritarian modes of 
democratic legitimation, which had precisely been promoted as ways of overcoming the 
democracy/efficiency trade-off. Furthermore, the ongoing politicisation of the EU’s policy 
direction, specifically, casts a critical light on non-majoritarian claims to input legitimacy 
that are based on the involvement of organized stakeholders. Rather, politicisation may 
reassert the need for more universal or inclusive modes of representation. In any case, 
the legitimacy of any kind of action by the EU needs a strong foundation in concurrent 
claims to its input legitimacy. 
In conclusion, both this paper’s conceptual discussion and its reconstruction of 
practical legitimacy discourses in the context of the EU institutions have suggested that 
input and output legitimacy necessarily belong together. Most arguments about the EU’s 
legitimacy, whether academic or practical, can be shown to involve both input- and 
output-related claims, whether explicit or implicit. Virtually all claims to one legitimacy 
type effectively require some claim or reference to the other type. On one hand, this can 
be a requirement in terms of the very logic of the claims about legitimacy they advance, in 
that one type of argument does not work without the other. This type of internal 
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dependency works especially in one direction. Output legitimacy in particular requires 
some reference to the input authenticity of the specific ends and goals of performance 
outputs, be it through substantive or formal, majoritarian or non-majoritarian, 
representation. On the other hand, input and output legitimacy seem mutually dependent 
in that they complement one another. They each make up for weaknesses at the other 
end of the spectrum, especially during periods of difficulty. This is why most legitimacy 
discourses, both academic and practical, effectively cover both bases and lay some claim 
to both input and output legitimacy. The discursive practice of the European institutions, 
but also of academics and other discursive actors, notably in the national public spheres, 
continuously reconstructed what the legitimacy of integration and the EU might mean 
and to what extent it depended on input- versus output related factors, as well as how the 
two types of legitimacy related to each other. What emerges as continuous in the 
discursive history recounted in this paper is that input and output legitimacy essentially 
depend on each other, whether internally or with a view to the overall goal of laying 
plausible claim to reasonable legitimacy. 
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